Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Science of Knowing (Wissenschaftslehre) [1st ed]', 'On Sufficient Reason' and 'Definitions'

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27 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Fichte's subjectivity struggles to then give any account of objectivity [Pinkard on Fichte]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought
Necessities rest on contradiction, and contingencies on sufficient reason [Leibniz]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
Definitions usually have a term, a 'definiendum' containing the term, and a defining 'definiens' [Gupta]
Notable definitions have been of piety (Plato), God (Anselm), number (Frege), and truth (Tarski) [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
A definition needs to apply to the same object across possible worlds [Gupta]
The 'revision theory' says that definitions are rules for improving output [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 3. Types of Definition
A definition can be 'extensionally', 'intensionally' or 'sense' adequate [Gupta]
Traditional definitions are general identities, which are sentential and reductive [Gupta]
Traditional definitions need: same category, mention of the term, and conservativeness and eliminability [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
Chemists aim at real definition of things; lexicographers aim at nominal definition of usage [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
If definitions aim at different ideals, then defining essence is not a unitary activity [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 10. Stipulative Definition
Stipulative definition assigns meaning to a term, ignoring prior meanings [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 11. Ostensive Definition
Ostensive definitions look simple, but are complex and barely explicable [Gupta]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 6. Ordering in Sets
The ordered pair <x,y> is defined as the set {{x},{x,y}}, capturing function, not meaning [Gupta]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
Normativity needs the possibility of negation, in affirmation and denial [Fichte, by Pinkard]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
Necessary truths derive from basic assertion and negation [Fichte, by Pinkard]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Fichte's logic is much too narrow, and doesn't deduce ethics, art, society or life [Schlegel,F on Fichte]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
Fichte's key claim was that the subjective-objective distinction must itself be subjective [Fichte, by Pinkard]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / a. Other minds
We only see ourselves as self-conscious and rational in relation to other rationalities [Fichte]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
The Self is the spontaneity, self-relatedness and unity needed for knowledge [Fichte, by Siep]
Novalis sought a much wider concept of the ego than Fichte's proposal [Novalis on Fichte]
The self is not a 'thing', but what emerges from an assertion of normativity [Fichte, by Pinkard]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
Consciousness of an object always entails awareness of the self [Fichte]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
Judgement is distinguishing concepts, and seeing their relations [Fichte, by Siep]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
Fichte's idea of spontaneity implied that nothing counts unless we give it status [Fichte, by Pinkard]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Fichte reduces nature to a lifeless immobility [Schlegel,F on Fichte]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Each of the infinite possible worlds has its own laws, and the individuals contain those laws [Leibniz]